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Abstract. In a two-player game, two cooperating but non communicating players, Alice and Bob, receive inputs taken from a probability distribution. Each of them produces an output and they win the game if they satisfy some predicate on their inputs/outputs. The entangled value ω * (G) of a game G is the maximum probability that Alice and Bob can win the game if they are allowed to share an entangled state prior to receiving their inputs. The n-fold parallel repetition G n of G consists of n instances of G where the players receive all the inputs at the same time and produce all the outputs at the same time. They win G n if they win each instance of G. In this paper we show that for any game G such that ω * (G) = 1 − ε < 1, ω * (G n ) decreases exponentially in n. First, for any game G on the uniform distribution, we show that ω
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where p is the input distribution of G and Q = |I| 2 maxxy p 1 Introduction
Contribution
The main contribution of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any game G on the uniform distribution with ω * (G) ≤ 1 − ε, we have:
−| log(ε)|) .
where |I| and |O| are respectively the size of the input and the output sets.
The class of entangled games with a uniform distribution is a large class of entangled games for which such parallel repetition was unknown. We can extend this result to any entangled game.
Corollary 1. For any game G such that ω
* (G) ≤ 1 − ε, we have that
where I and O are respectively the input and output sets and Q = This corollary can be obtained directly from the previous theorem. It is not as strong as usual parallel repetition theorems with exponential decay because of this dependency on Q. Notice however that Q depends only on the game G and not on n.
Remark: In a previous version of this paper, we had a different claim which had a flaw in the proof. We replaced it by the above Corollary which is weaker in the sense that it gives non trivial bounds only for the case where min xy {p xy } = 0.
Superposed Information cost
In order to prove the main theorem, we introduce the concept of Superposed Information Cost of a game, an insightful concept and the cornerstone of our proof.
This concept is derived from the notion of information cost widely used in communication complexity [6, 2, 4, 18] . In the setting of communication complexity, we consider a function f (x, y) and suppose that Alice has some input x and Bob some input y. They want to determine the outcome of f (x, y) for a certain function f with the minimal amount of communication. The interactive information cost IC of f describes the least amount of information that Alice and Bob need to have about each other's inputs in order to compute f (x, y).
We want to follow a similar approach for entangled games. In entangled games, the quantum state Alice and Bob share is independent of the inputs x, y. We now give extra resources to Alice and Bob: advice states. Alice and Bob are given an advice state |φ xy that can depend on their inputs. This can greatly increase their winning probability. For example, Alice could have perfect knowledge of Bob's input y, and vice-versa.
We define (informally) the information cost of a game as follows:
Information Cost for entangled games Alice and Bob are given advice states |φ xy to share that can depend on their inputs. What is the minimal amount of information that these states have to give Alice and Bob about each other's input, in order to allow them to win the game with probability 1?
This is a natural extension of the information cost to entangled games. However, it is a limited notion since we cannot relate it to the entangled value of the game. (A simple counterexample can be obtained from the CHSH game.) Therefore, we extended this notion to the case where we allow the players to be in a superposition of their inputs.
Superposed Information Cost (SIC) for entangled games
We extend the notion of information cost by allowing the players to have a superposition of their inputs. We then consider the amount of information that advice states have to give Alice and Bob about each other's input, in order to allow them to win with probability 1.
These notions are defined precisely in Section 3.1.
Lower bounding the value of entangled games using the superposed information cost. The reason we introduce the superposed information cost for entangled games is that we want to have an information theoretic characterization of the value of entangled games. The next theorem states that the value of any entangled game on the uniform distribution can be lower bounded by the superposed information cost (this does not hold for the non-superposed one).
Theorem 2. For any game G with a uniform input distribution, we have SIC(G)
32 ln (2) or equivalently ω * (G) ≥ 1 − 32 ln(2) · SIC(G).
The Superposed information cost is additive under parallel repetition:
Putting these two results together, we have
32 ln (2) . This result shows that SIC(G n )
is large when n increases and can be seen as evidence that the game G n is hard to win and that ω * (G n ) decreases fast.
Using SIC to show our parallel repetition theorem. We fix a game G with ω * (G) = 1 − ε and ω * (G n ) = 2 −t for some t. In order to prove our theorem, we consider a quantity S which is strongly related to SIC(G n ). We show that
The lower bound is a natural extension of the above argument about the additivity of SIC. The ingredient we need to show the upper bound is the following communication task :
-The players use an optimal strategy for G n and win with probability ω * (G n ) = 2 −t .
-Alice sends m = O( t log(|I||O|) ε ) bits to Bob. -Using this message, Bob's goal is to determine with high probability whether they won most of the games or not.
Switching to a communication task and to a related quantity S seems much weaker than showing directly an upper bound on SIC(G n ), but it will be enough for us. Combining these two results, we conclude that t = Ω( nε 2 log(|I||O|) ) or equivalently, for ε close to 0, ω
) .
Organization of the paper
Section 2 contains preliminaries about entangled games. In Section 3, we define the key concept of the superposed information cost for a game and show that this quantity is additive when repeating games in parallel. In Section 4, we provide a brief organization of the main proof. In Section 5, we show Theorem 2 and some generalizations. In Section 6 we derive the upper bound of (1) (the lower bound is proven in the main paper). Finally, in Section 7 we prove our main theorem. Many proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Entangled Games
The value of an entangled game Definition 1. An entangled game G = (I, O, V, p) is defined by finite input and output sets I and O as well as an accepting function V : O 2 × I 2 → {0, 1} and a probability distribution p :
A strategy for the game proceeds as follows. Alice and Bob can share any quantum state. Then, Alice receives an input x ∈ I and Bob receives an input y ∈ I where these inputs are sampled according to p. They can perform any quantum operation but are not allowed to communicate. Alice outputs a ∈ O and Bob outputs b ∈ O. They win the game if V (a, b|x, y) = 1.
The entangled value of a game G is the maximal probability with which Alice and Bob can win the game. From standard purification techniques, we have that w.l.o.g., Alice and Bob share a pure state |φ and their optimal strategy consists of projective measurements A x = {A x a } a∈O and B y = {B y b } b∈O on |φ . This means that after receiving their inputs, they share a state of the form ρ = x,y∈I p xy |x x| ⊗ |φ φ| ⊗ |y y|, for some state |φ .
Definition 2. The entangled value of a game G is
We write p = Unif. when this is the case.
Value of a game with advice states Consider a game G = (I, O, V, p). We are interested in the value of the game when the two players share an advice state |φ xy additionally to their inputs x, y. This means that Alice and Bob share a state of the form ρ = x,y,a,b p xy |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y|.
Definition 4.
The entangled value of G, given that Alice and Bob share the above state ρ is
Repetition of entangled games In the n-fold parallel repetition of a game G, each player gets n inputs from I and must produce n outputs from O. Each instance of the game will be evaluated as usual by the function V . The players win the parallel repetition game if they win all the instances. More formally, for a game
While playing G n , we say that Alice and Bob win game i if
Majority game For a game G = (I, O, V, p) and a real number α ∈ [0, 1] we define G
Advice states, superposed players and information cost
The notion of information cost has been very useful for communication complexity. Here we derive a similar notion for entangled games.
Consider a game with advice state as defined in Section 2. The advice state can potentially greatly help the players. For example, Alice could know y and Bob could know x. We ask ourselves the following question: There are different ways of characterizing this dependency on x, y. A first possibility would be to consider the information that Alice has about y and Bob has about x while sharing ρ. However, there are cases where Alice and Bob can win a game with probability 1 using an advice state while still not learning anything about each other's input. For example, take the CHSH game [7] and consider the states |φ 00 = |φ 01 = |φ 10 = (|01 + |10 ). If the two players share the state ρ =
x,y∈{0,1} 1/4|x x| X ⊗|φ xy φ xy | AB ⊗|y y| Y , Alice has no information about y and Bob has no information about x. On the other hand, if both players measure their registers A and B in the computational basis and output the results, they will win the CHSH game with probability 1 hence ω * (CHSH|ρ) = 1 while ω * (CHSH) = cos 2 (π/8). We must consider a slightly different scenario so that Alice or Bob can learn something about the other player's input. When considering the amount of information that Alice has about Bob's input y, we allow Alice to have a coherent superposition of her inputs. Similarly, we will be interested in the amount of information Bob has about x when he has a coherent superposition of his inputs.
This scenario is motivated as follows: if Alice and Bob have a common procedure to create |φ xy from their respective inputs x and y, Alice can create a superposition of her inputs and they can perform the same procedure. This scenario has for example been in order to show optimal bounds for quantum bit commitment [5] .
This approach leads to the definition of the superposed information cost of a game. In the next section, we give formal definitions of this notion.
The superposed information cost
Consider a family of states {|φ xy } xy and a probability distribution {p xy } xy . Let p x· = y p xy and p ·y = x p xy . Let |L 
Here σ A (resp. σ B ) corresponds to ρ where Alice's input (resp. Bob's input) is put in a coherent superposition. We first define the superposed information cost of a family of states with a probability distribution. Remark: This definition has good properties when the input distribution is a product distribution or close to a product distribution. One may want to consider a more general definition when considering any distribution.
We also define the superposed information cost of a shared state ρ of the form ρ = xy∈[k] p xy |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y|. 
4 Organisation of the proof of Theorem 1
In Section 5, we show how to use the Superposed Information Cost of a game G to bound its entangled value ω * (G). We first show:
32 ln (2) . We also extend this theorem as follows:
There exists a small constant c 0 such that for any game (2) which gives by additivity of the superposed information cost that SIC(G n ) ≥ nε 32 ln (2) . Ideally, we would like to upper bound SIC(G n ) with a function of ω * (G n ). Unfortunately, we are not able to do this directly. In Section 6, we show the following weaker statement:
and a state ξ = xy p xy |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y| satisfying the following properties:
The first condition states that p is in some sense close to the uniform distribution hence G ′ is close to G n 1−ε/32 . This theorem is weaker than an upper bound on SIC(G ′ ) which itself is weaker than an upper bound on SIC(G n ), but this kind of upper bound will be enough. In Appendix E, we prove the following matching lower bound.
we have SIC(ρ) ≥ Ω(nε).
In Section 7, we show how to use the two above theorems to conclude:
Overview of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. For any game G on the uniform distribution,
32 ln (2) .
We sketch the proof as follows. We fix a game
) corresponds to the input-superposed state that Alice (resp. Bob) has, conditioned on Bob getting y (resp. Alice getting x). Let F denote the fidelity of quantum states. We prove the following three inequalities.
First we show that
for some (sets of) unitaries
Putting the three inequalities together, we get
Since this holds for any ρ satisfying ω
32 ln(2) .
Overview of Theorem 4
In this section we sketch the proof of Theorem 4. The construction of the state ξ will directly be inspired by a communication task that we now present.
The communication task Fix a game
We now consider the following task H(p, m).
Task H(p, m)
-Alice and Bob are allowed to share any quantum state |φ .
-Alice and Bob get inputs x = x 1 , . . . , x n and y = y 1 , . . . , y n , with x, y ∈ I n , following the uniform distribution.
-Alice is allowed to send m bits to Bob -Then Alice outputs some value a ∈ O n and Bob outputs some value b ∈ O n or 'Abort'.
For each index i, we say that Alice and Bob win game i if Bob does not abort and V (a i , b i |x i , y i ) = 1. We require the following Showing how to perform this task with a small amount of communication is a first step towards the construction of ξ. We consider the following protocol P that efficiently performs this task. Protocol P for the task H(p,m)
1. Let v ≤ n be an integer, to be determined at the end of this section. Alice and Bob have shared randomness that correspond to v random (not necessarily different) indices i 1 , . . . , i v ∈ [n] as well as a state |φ that allows them to win G n with probability at least
−(t+1) . 2. Alice and Bob receive uniform inputs x, y. They perform a strategy that wins all n games with probability 2 −(t+1) and have some outputs a = a 1 , . . . , a n and b = b 1 , . . . , b n . 3. For each index i ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i v }, Alice sends x i and a i to Bob. 4. For each of these indices i, Bob looks at x i , y i , a i , b i and checks whether they win on all of these v games, i.e. , he checks that for all these indices, V (a i , b i |x i , y i ) = 1. 5. If they do win on all of these games, Bob outputs b. Otherwise, Bob outputs 'Abort'. 
Next, we have: 
This gives us:
Pr[A and B win
We can take v = 
Using the communication task to prove Theorem 4
The idea is the following: Alice and Bob perform protocol P for the task H(p, m) performing everything in superposition, including the messages and their shared randomness. The advice state we consider is the state ρ N A Alice and Bob share conditionned on Bob not aborting. This state ρ N A can be written as
To prove the theorem, we must show the following properties for ρ N A .
H(XY
The ideas behind the proofs of these three properties are as follows:
, when conditionning on Bob winning, we remove at most t bits of entropy from the (uniform) inputs in X, Y , the 1 in the inequality is there for technical reasons.
In the task H(p,m), P r[Alice and Bob win
This directly implies the second property 3. In protocol P, before Alice sends her message, Bob has no information about x. Alice sends a message of size m, which gives m bits of information about Alice's input. Conditionning on Bob winning gives him an extra 2t bits of information. Since m = 32 log(|I||O|) ε ((t + 1) + | log(ε)| + 5) from the previous Proposition, we can conclude.
Final Theorem
Theorem 1. For any game G = (I, O, V, Unif.) with ω * (G) ≤ 1 − ε, we have:
) as defined in Section 2. Using Theorem 4, we know there exists a state ξ = xy p xy |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y| and a game
where 2 −t = ω * (G n ). We now distinguish two cases
and the theorem holds directly. -If t = o(εn), we need the following argument. The state ξ satisfies all the properties of Theorem 5 which implies that SIC(ξ) = Ω(nε). We combine the two inequalities and obtain
It follows that t = Ω nε 2 log(|I||O|) − | log(ε)| , which allows us to conclude
Finally, we extend the result to games with complete support (i.e. , games on distributions p such that ∃(x, y) for which p xy = 0). This bound is weaker than the main result, because it depends also on p. Corollary 1. Let G = (I, O, V, p) be a game with complete support and ω
where Q = 
A Preliminaries
A.1 Useful facts about the fidelity and trace distance of two quantum states.
We start by stating a few properties of the trace distance ∆ and fidelity F between two quantum states. These two notions characterize how close two quantum states are.
Trace distance between two quantum states Definition 8. For any two quantum states ρ, σ, the trace distance ∆ between them is given by ∆(ρ, σ) = ∆(σ, ρ) =
Here the used trace norm may be expressed as X tr = √ X † X = max U |tr(XU )|, where the maximization is taken over all unitaries of the appropriate size. 
There is a strategy for Bob that achieves the value 
Proposition 9 ([25,21]). For any two quantum states
ρ, σ max ξ F 2 (ρ, ξ) + F 2 (ξ, σ) = 1 + F(ρ, σ).
Proposition 10 ([11]
). For any quantum states ρ, σ, we have
As direct corollaries of Proposition 9, we have Proposition 11. Let |A , |B , |C be three quantum states. We have 
Proof. Using Proposition 9, we have ρ 3 ) ).
Proposition 13. For two quantum states
Proof. We use the following definition of the fidelity:
A.2 Information Theory
For a quantum state ρ, the entropy of ρ is H(ρ) = −tr(ρ log(ρ)). For a quantum state ρ ∈ X ⊗ Y, H(X) ρ is the entropy of the quantum register in the space X when the total underlying state is ρ. In other words,
We define H min (ρ) = − log(λ max ) where λ max is the maximum eigenvalue of ρ. For ρ in X ⊗ Y, we define 
Claim (Subadditivity of the conditional entropy).

H(AB|C) ≤ H(A|C) + H(B|C)
Claim ([19] ).
where ρ A = T r B (ρ) and ρ B = T r A (ρ)
Claim (from [26]).
For any distribution p on a universe U , if H(p) ≥ log(|U |) − ε then ∆(p, Unif.) ≤ ε, where Unif. is the uniform distribution.
B Additivity of the superposed information cost
Our goal here is to prove the additivity of the superposed information cost, i.e. that SIC(G n ) = nSIC(G). Before the proof, we introduce some notation and prove a lemma.
Let G = (I, O, V, p) and let G n = (I n , O n , V n , q). For a string x = x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ I n , let x −i be the string in I n−1 where we remove x i from x. Let ρ = x,y∈I n q xy |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y| satisfying ω * (G n |ρ) = 1.
As in Section 3.1, we define |L A y , |L B x , σ A , σ B for ρ. We first prove the following Lemma:
we have that
Proof. By definition of G n , we have q xy = Π j p xj ,yj . We define q −i xy = Π j =i p xj,yj . For each i, we can rewrite ρ as:
xi,yi | ⊗ |y i y i |. ρ i corresponds to ρ where the registers in X −i , Y −i are put in superposition. Hence, Alice and Bob can go from ρ i to ρ by measuring the registers X −i and Y −i in the computational basis. Using ρ, Alice and Bob can win the i th instance of G with probability 1. This means that they can also win this i th instance of G when sharing ρ i and ω * (G|ρ i ) = 1. We define
We now also define the two new superposed states of ρ i We can now prove our proposition:
Proof. We have:
where the first inequality comes from the subadditivity of the quantum conditional entropy and the last inequality comes from Lemma 1. Since this holds for any state ρ satisfying ω * (G n |ρ) = 1, we conclude that
We can also notice that SIC(G n ) ≤ nSIC(G). Indeed, consider a state ρ such that ω * (G|ρ) = 1. We have ω * (G n |ρ ⊗n ) = 1. Moreover, SIC(ρ ⊗n ) = nSIC(ρ). From there, we have SIC(G n ) ≤ nSIC(G). We conclude that SIC(G n ) = nSIC(G).
C Proof of Theorems 2 and 3
The organisation and an overview of the proof can be found in Section 5.
C.1 First inequality
We will show this inequality for any input distribution. Let ρ = x,y∈[k] p xy |x x| X ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | AB ⊗ |y y| Y . As in Section 3.1, we define |L ) corresponds to the input-superposed state that Alice (resp. Bob) has, conditioned on Bob getting y (resp. Alice getting x). We prove the following.
Proof. 
Similarly, we can show that 1
). Combining these with Eq. 2, we conclude that
C.2 Second inequality
Let ρ = 
The expectations will always be taken over the uniform distribution. We first show the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
There exist i, j ∈ [k] as well as unitaries {U x } x and {V y } y acting respectively on A and B such that if we define |Ω xy = (U x ⊗ V y )|φ xy , we have:
We have
For each y, consider the unitary U y acting on B such that | L x |x |ξ xy for some |ξ xy . Therefore, we have:
Since we took U j = I B , we have |ξ xj = |φ xj for all x. We can hence rewrite for all y
We now analyze Bob's side of the state similarly. Let |M
. Hence for all x, x ′ , we have
For each x, consider the unitary
. Such a unitary exists by Uhlmann's theorem. We take V i = I A . Since |M y |Ω xy |y for some |Ω xy . Therefore, we have:
we have |ξ iy = |Ω iy for all y. Using Eq. 5, we can hence rewrite for all x:
Note finally that for all x, (V x ⊗I B )(|ξ xy ) = |Ω xy hence we have for all x and for all y Ω xy |Ω xy ′ = ξ xy |ξ xy ′ . Using Eq. 4, we have
Equations 7 and 8 give
Combining this with equations 3 and 6, we conclude
We can now prove the main proposition of this section. 
where
with |Ω xy = U x ⊗ V y |φ xy . Using Proposition 11, we have
It follows that
Similarly, we get Ex,
Using Proposition 11 again, we have
This gives us
we have max 
From there, we have:
This proposition has a useful corollary:
for unitaries {U x } x and {V y } y acting respectively on A and B.
Proof. Let {U x } x ,{V y } y that maximize max |Ω x,y∈I p xy | Ω|(U x ⊗V y )|φ xy | 2 . Let |ψ xy = U x ⊗V y |φ xy . Let η = xy p xy |x x| ⊗ |ψ xy ψ xy | ⊗ |y y|. Since Alice and Bob can go from η to ρ by applying respectively U † x and V † y , we conclude that ω * (G|η) = ω * (G|ρ) = 1. Using Proposition 16, we have max
We now prove a similar statement in the case ω * (G|ρ) < 1.
Proposition 17. Consider a game G = (I, O, V, p) and a state ρ = x,y∈I p xy |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y|.
Proof. Consider strategies {A 
We conclude that ω
We derive two corollaries from this proposition. 
for unitaries {U x } x and {V y } y acting respectively on A and B, then
Let |ψ xy = U x ⊗ V y |φ xy . Let η = xy p xy |x x| ⊗ |ψ xy ψ xy | ⊗ |y y|. Since Alice and Bob can go from η to ρ by applying respectively U † x and V † y , we conclude that ω * (G|η) = ω * (G|ρ) ≥ 1 − γ. Using Proposition 17, we conclude that ω
Taking a counterpostitive of the above Corollary we get the following 
C.4 Putting it together
We can now show our theorems x,y |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y| such that ω * (G|ρ) = 1. Using Proposition 14 and Proposition 15, take {U x } x and {V y } y such that
Using Corollary 2, we have
From there, we have
32 ln (2) . Since this holds for any ρ satisfying ω * (G|ρ) = 1, we can conclude
We now proceed to prove a similar result for the case where ω * (G|ρ) < 1.
Proposition 18. For any game G with a uniform input distribution, and any state ρ such that ω
Proof. The proof will be similar to the previous one. Consider a game
x,y |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y| such that ω * (G|ρ) = 1 − γ. Using Proposition 14 and Proposition 15, take {U x } and {V y } such that
Using Corollary 4, we have that
. Since this holds for any ρ satisfying ω * (G|ρ) = 1, we can conclude that SIC(G) ≥ 1−ω * (G) 32 ln (2) .
Our last extension is the following theorem, which is the one we will use for parallel repetition.
Theorem 3.
There exists a constant c 0 > 0 such that for any game
x,y |p xy − 1 k 2 | ≤ c 0 ε and any state ρ = xy p xy |x x| ⊗ |φ xy φ xy | ⊗ |y y| such that ω
We also fix a small constant c 0 that will be specified later in the proof. Let ρ(U ) = 
From there, by using Claim A.2 and Propositions 10 and 12, we have:
Then, we have:
which gives us
As in Proposition 14, we can show that
Using Proposition 15, we have:
We have ω(G) = 1 − ε and ω(G|ρ(U )) ≥ 1 − ε/4 − δ. Using Corollary 4, we have:
From there, we conclude:
By taking c 0 = 1 8092 , which implies δ ≤ ε 8092 , we obtain SIC(ρ) = Ω(ε).
D Proof of Theorem 4
We first present the actual construction of ξ and then show it has the desired properties required for Theorem 4.
-Alice and Bob perform protocol P where the inputs are classical but the randomness, the message and the outputs are left in a quantum superposition. To maintain the "classicality" of the message sent by Alice, we ask Alice to have a quantum register which acts as a copy of the message. -We ask Bob to determine whether he aborts or not. The state ξ will be the state Alice and Bob share conditioned on Bob not aborting. -Using Proposition 3, we prove that ξ has the desired properties Procedure for constructing ξ 1. Alice and Bob pick random inputs x, y ∈ R I n = [k n ]. They also share a state r γ r |r RA ⊗ |φ AB ⊗ |r RB where |φ is the same as in protocol P and r corresponds to the shared randomness in protocol P . 2. Alice and Bob perform a strategy that allows them to win G n with probability 2 −(t+1) but keep their outputs in a coherent superposition instead of measuring. We can write |Ω Let ρ −Z = T r Z (ρ 3 ). Since the probability of Bob not aborting is p, we can write
for some state ρ AB . ρ N A is of the form xy q xy |x x| ⊗ |Y In the above protocol, ρ 2 corresponds to the state Alice and Bob share after Step 3 of protocol P except that the randomness, message and outputs are kept in a quantum superposition in the way described above.
Similarly, ξ = ρ N A corresponds to the state at the end of protocol P , conditioned on Bob not aborting. Again, the randomness, message and outputs are kept in a quantum superposition in the way described above.
D.1 Showing the desired properties of ξ = ρ N A
We now show that ξ = ρ N A has the desired properties of Theorem 4.
1) H(XY
Proof. This holds by construction of ξ. Indeed, ξ is the superposed version of the state Alice and Bob share after protocol P conditionned on Bob not aborting. We know that in this case, P r[Alice and Bob win ≥ (1 − ε/32)n games | Bob does not abort] ≥ (1 − ε/32). From there, we have ω
Proof. We upper bound the superposed information cost of the state ξ = ρ N A . We are interested in the superposed states σ 
= − log(Pr[ Bob guesses x | Alice and Bob share σ We conclude that I(X :
We now prove the following:
Moreover, we can write σ
Using Equations 9 and 10, we have:
We now put everything together and prove the following.
Proof. Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we have + t + 1 = t + 1. Putting this all together, we have:
To conclude the proof, recall from Section 6 that m = 32 log(|I||O|) ε ((t + 1) + | log(ε)| + 5). From there, we conclude that SIC(ξ) ≤ 32 log(|I||O|) ε ((t + 1) + | log(ε)| + 5) + 2t + 2, which concludes the proof.
We showed that ξ satsfies all the desired properties of Theorem 4.
For each i, we rewrite ρ as:
The state γ i corresponds to ρ where the inputs in registers X −i , Y −i are in coherent superposition. In particular, Alice and Bob can go from γ i to ρ by measuring the registers X −i and Y −i in the computational basis.
Using ρ, Alice and Bob can win the i th instance of G with probability p i . This means that they can win this i th instance of G when sharing γ i with probability at least p i . Now, consider σ = Ω(ε).
Proof. Consider i ∈ K ∩ L. Since i ∈ L, we have H(X i Y i ) γi ≥ 2 log(k) − 4t/n ≥ 2 log(k) − c 0 ε. Using Claim A.2, we have ∆(p i , Unif.) ≤ c 0 ε or in other words that We can now finish the proof. The above lemma holds for our t since t = o(εn). First notice that T r Y−i (σ 
F Games with complete support
In this Appendix we prove Corollary 1. The idea is the following. Starting from any game G with complete support, we define a new game H that can be interpreted as follows:
-With some probability Alice and Bob play G U , a variant of G on the uniform distribution -If they are not in the previous case, they win no matter what they answer -They know in which case they are thanks to an extra input bit -If they ignore the extra bit of information, they play the original game.
In Lemma 7 we prove that H n has a larger value than G n , which intuitively follows from the fact that players can just ignore the extra bits. Since the difficulty of winning H n comes from the indices where Alice and Bob must play G U , in Lemma 8 we show that the winning probability of H n is bounded by the winning probability of a parallel repetition of G U . We have an exponential decay because G U meets the requirements of Theorem 1. To finish, we relate ω * (G) to ω * (G U ) in Lemma 9 and we prove Corollary 1.
Let us start with some definitions. Let G = (I, O, V, p) with |I| = k. Let α min = min xy {k 2 p xy } and α max = max xy {k 2 p xy }. We have:
Let U be the uniform distribution on I 2 . By seeing p and U as vectors indexed by (x, y), we can rewrite the above as α min U ≤ p ≤ α max U . Let p ′ the probability distribution satisfying p = α min U + (1 − α min )p ′ . LetĨ = {0, 1} × I and q be the distribution onĨ 2 such that q 0x0y = This means that if Alice and Bob's extra bit is 0 the predicate is the same than the predicate of G, while if the extra bit is 1 they always win. Notice that for each c ∈ {0, 1}, we haveṼ (ab|cxcy) ≥ V (ab|xy). Now consider the parallel repetition. Letx,ỹ ∈Ĩ n , where we writex i = c i x i andỹ i = c i y i with x i , y i ∈ I and c i being the extra bit. LetṼ ′ and V ′ be the predicates for H n and G n , respectively. Then for all a, b, we havẽ
Proof. Fix an optimal strategy for G n . Let P (ab|xy) the probability that Alice and Bob output a, b ∈ O n on inputs x, y ∈ I n when applying such strategy for G n . We have ω * (G n ) = xyab p xy P (ab|xy)V ′ (ab|xy).
Define the following strategy for H n . Alice and Bob, on inputsx,ỹ ∈Ĩ n according to q n , ignore the extra bit and apply the above optimal strategy for G n on inputs x, y. LetP (ab|xỹ) the probability of outputs a, b on
Proof. Fix an optimal strategy for G U and let P (ab|xy) the probability of outputs a, b on inputs x, y for this strategy. We have ε U = xyab 1 k 2 P (ab|xy)(1 − V (ab|xy)) ≥ xyab p xy α max P (ab|xy)(1 − V (ab|xy)) ≥ ε α max .
Finally, we combine all of the above in the final corollary Proof. By chaining the previous lemmas, we obtain ) .
